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Abstract
Participants decided whom of two patients to prioritize for surgery in three studies. The factual quantitative infor-
mation about the patients (e.g., probability of surviving surgery) was given in vignette form with case descriptions on
Visual Analogue Scales — VAS’s. Differentiation and Consolidation theory predicts that not only the attractiveness of
facts but also the mental representations of objective facts themselves will be restructured in post-decision processes
in support of a decision (Svenson, 2003). After the decision, participants were asked to reproduce the objective facts
about the patients. The results showed that distortions of objective facts were used to consolidate a prior decision. The
consolidation process relied on facts initially favoring the non-chosen alternative and on facts rated as less, rather than
more important.
Keywords: cognitive psychology, decision making, medical decisions, coherence, differentiation and consolidation.
1 Introduction
Differentiation and Consolidation, Diff Con, theory is a
process theory of human decision making. It models
decision making as a process involving different kinds
of sub processes leading to a final decision (Svenson,
1992, 2003, 2006). According to the theory human de-
cision makers structure and restructure both evaluations
and facts about decision alternatives when they make a
decision and after the decision. The goal of that process
is to reach sufficient support for the chosen alternative.
For example, a positively evaluated aspect of the initially
preferred alternative can be bolstered to make the alterna-
tive seem even better when a decision has been reached.
In the post-decision consolidation phase this process con-
tinues to strengthen the decision when afterthoughts and
outcomes follow. The theory shares a process and attrac-
tiveness restructuring approach to decision making with a
number of other models of human decision making (Fes-
tinger, 1957, 1964; Janis & Mann, 1977, Mather, Shafir
& Johnson, 2003; Montgomery, 1983; Payne, Bettman
& Johnson, 1993; Russo, Medvec & Meloy, 1996; Si-
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mon, Pham, Le & Holyoak, 2001; Simon, Snow &
Read, 2004), some of which were reviewed by Brown-
stein (2003) and by Simon, Snow and Read (2004). Em-
pirical decision research has shown time after time that
value/attractiveness evaluation and diagnostic value of
facts are restructured before and after a decision, support-
ing these theories (Brownstein, 2003; Carlson & Klein
Pearo, 2004; Glöckner & Engel, 2008; Russo, Medvec
& Meloy, 1996; Russo, Carlson & Meloy, 2006; Salo
& Svenson, 2001; Simon, Krawczyk & Holyoak, 2004;
Simon, Krawczyk, Bleicher & Holyoak, 2007; Svenson,
1996, 2003, 2006; Svenson & Shamoun, 1997). That is,
the chosen alternative is upgraded in attractiveness or in
diagnostic value of evidence pro that alternative (Simon,
Krawczyk & Holyoak, 2004), and/or the non- chosen al-
ternative is downgraded before and after a decision.
However, there is a lack of empirical investigations of
consolidation of facts in themselves. If a decision maker
is given objective travel time (e.g., 40 min) as a fact of one
alternative in a decision between two job offers, she or he
may change the evaluation of this fact (e.g. from “re-
laxing” to “boring”) in the process of making a decision.
This evaluation does not mean that the quantitative facts
representation must change. The decision maker should
be able to communicate the exact travel time (e.g., 40
min within a non-systematic random error) even if there
was an evaluative restructuring and no facts restructur-
ing. Facts consolidation appears when the quantitative or
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qualitative facts of a decision problem are communicated
or reproduced in a distorted way in support of a decision.1
The hindsight paradigm introduced by Fischhoff
(1975, 2007) uses a judgment approach that has some
similarity with the present decision approach but with a
focus on the post-event outcome phase. Fischhoff, and
other researchers following him, studied how the mem-
ory of a person’s prior quantitative probability judgments
(a kind of self generated quantitative “fact”) was distorted
after outcome knowledge. They found that in general the
quantitative distortions were in the direction of “we knew
it all before” bias. Mather, Shafir and Jonhson (2001,
2003) studied post-decision memory attributions to the
chosen and the non-chosen alternative(s) after a decision
with alternatives described by qualitative features of vary-
ing attractiveness. They found that features with positive
attractiveness were attributed comparatively more often
to the chosen alternative than to the non-chosen alterna-
tive. The opposite was found for negative features. When
an alternative was assigned to participants, the memory
attributions were less supportive of the assigned option
than for an option that was chosen voluntary. This shows
that the decision process had a selective effect on mem-
ories of evaluative features. Gurkmankin Levy and Her-
shey (2006) had their participants make treatment choices
(yes or no) concerning a medical treatment with side ef-
fects and a success rate of 40%. However, “since all pa-
tients are different he [the doctor] can’t be certain that this
1Decision processes, like any other processes, are described in rela-
tion to a structure where the processes take place and change the struc-
ture. To illustrate, in order to describe how one job offer gradually
improves over another alternative in a decision process (the process) it
is necessary to postulate how the job offers should be described (struc-
ture). Decision alternatives can be represented in a holistic way as en-
tities in themselves in a structure. However, usually the structure of a
decision problem is described in a more decomposed way using, for ex-
ample, an alternative x attribute (or dimension) representation matrix.
An aspect is the primitive or smallest postulated unit in this represen-
tation and it is associated with physical/objective (e.g., a color), sub-
jective cognitive (perceived color) and evaluative (e.g., attractiveness of
the color) representations. The evaluative or attractiveness representa-
tions of aspects can be mapped on attribute scales. To illustrate, in a job
preference decision problem one alternative may be represented by 30
min travel from home to work. This is the objective physical factual rep-
resentation of that aspect (f 1). When traveling or thinking of the travel,
the time may be perceived or subjectively cognitively represented (c1)
as longer or shorter (depending on what activity is carried out during
the travel, how monotonous the travel is etc.). However, if the decision
maker is asked about the objective travel time she or he should be able
to give the objective time irrespective of whether it is perceived as long
or short. Finally, the evaluation attractiveness (a1) of the travel is deter-
mined by the perceived travel time mapped onto the decision maker’s
value system and her or his affective reactions. The attractiveness repre-
sents what the decision maker values in life (e.g., using public transport
is good, I like a comfortable and short travel) and reactions of an affec-
tive emotional kind (e.g., I feel subway tunnels give me claustrophobic
feelings). The importance of different attributes for a decision can be
represented on rank order scales or on more advanced scales. To ex-
emplify, the salary may be more important than the distance to a job
(within a certain range) or it may be twice as important.
is your probability” (Gurkmankin Levy & Hershey 2006
p. 57). This instruction communicated uncertainty about
the probability fact that was used in distortions support-
ing a participant’s choice.
Instead of investigating qualitative evaluative features
or uncertain probabilities, the present studies will inves-
tigate precise quantitative facts on well-defined attributes
to find out if the facts are distorted in post-decision mem-
ory reproductions. To specify, the present studies were
designed to test the Diff Con prediction that facts are re-
structured in post-decision consolidation.
If the hypothesis is confirmed, the sub-processes of the
restructuring process will be investigated. One example
is the subprocesses restructuring the mental representa-
tions of both the chosen and the non-chosen alternative.
Is the chosen alternative restructured to a greater extent
than the non-chosen alternative? This is a new problem
that has not been focused on in the past, since the attrac-
tiveness of facts or the diagnosticity of facts were in focus
— not the facts in themselves. Earlier studies of differen-
tiation and consolidation have shown that attractiveness
restructuring does not normally appear on the most im-
portant decisive attribute to support a choice. Instead,
this is a kind of restructuring that focuses on important
conflict attributes that favor a non-chosen alternative. In
fact, attractiveness consolidation processes in a real-life
decision sometimes turn disadvantages of a chosen alter-
native into advantages after the decision. This was first
reported by Svenson and Hill (1997) and later verified
by Salo and Svenson (2001) in another real-life context.
We do not expect such drastic restructuring of facts, but
according to Diff Con we predict no systematic changes
on the most important decisive attribute but systematic
changes of other attributes and in particular changes of
facts supporting the non-chosen alternative.
We also want to introduce the Visual Analogue Scale,
VAS, in a way that is new to decision process research.
This scale has been used primarily in health care to mea-
sure pain and in other contexts as a quantitative response
scale. But, in the present context it will be used to give
information about facts. According to Diff Con theory,
a decision has to be sufficiently involving and impor-
tant to trigger differentiation and consolidation processes.
Therefore, we will use a difficult and engaging medical
problem in the following empirical studies.
We predict (1) that facts consolidation will restructure
and distort the reproductions of quantitative facts in sup-
port of the chosen alternative, (2) that quantitative facts
restructuring will follow the same pattern as attractive-
ness restructuring and concern predominantly other at-
tributes than the most important decisive attribute, and
in particular conflict attributes, (3) that facts restructur-
ing can be achieved through changes of both the chosen
(increasing facts support) and the non-chosen alternative
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(weakening facts support for the non-chosen alternative).
We also want (4) to introduce facts presented on VAS
scales. The design will be balanced in order to control for
response regression effects easily confounded with true
restructuring processes depending on a prior decision.
In the first study, economics students serve as partic-
ipants, and we use the VAS, visual analogue scale, to
present a medical vignette case. The second study repli-
cates the first study with a group of participants who are
familiar with medical problems and the VAS. Finally, the
third study asks whether results from the earlier studies
replicate with a new group of participants.
2 Study 1
Study 1 examines post-decision representations to detect
post-decision consolidation and possible post-decision
consolidation changes.
2.1 Method
2.1.1 Participants
A total of 64 students of economics at the University of
Stockholm participated in the study. There were 31 fe-
male and 33 male participants aged from 21 to 42 years
with a median of 25 years.
2.1.2 Material
Decision Problem. The problem was to prioritize a male
or a female patient for surgery. The woman was presented
in the left column and the man in the right column on an
A4 sheet of paper. The instructions stated that the ex-
isting resources allowed only one of the patients to have
surgery. The patient who was given priority and surgery
would survive with given probabilities and the patient not
given priority would die within some time. The vignettes
describing the patients were condensed into measures on
5 VAS scales for each of the two patients in order to
achieve full experimental control: (1) Age of the patient
(left endpoint = 0 years, right endpoint = 50 years), (2)
Expected survival time without surgery in months (left
endpoint = 0 months, right endpoint = 5 months), (3)
Probability of surviving surgery (left endpoint = 0, right
endpoint = 100%), (4) Probability of surviving 5 years
if having survived surgery (left endpoint = 0, right end-
point = 100%), and (5) Expected quality of life if surviv-
ing surgery (left endpoint = completely handicapped right
endpoint = completely healthy). The facts, each given on
56 mm long VAS scales are given in Table 1. Each pa-
tient was described by small vertical lines on the VAS.
Greater values on scales (3), (4) and (5) speak for priority
of surgery, while the opposite is true for scales (1) and
(2).
Control of response anchoring effects on the VAS.
When analyzing quantitative responses from visual ana-
logue scales (VAS), there are two main response biases
that may distort the results. One is response regression
towards the middle of a scale and the other is response
regression towards one of the end points of the scale
(Poulton, 1989). With the aim of controlling for this,
the scales with factual information were counter balanced
pair-wise. This can be inferred from the numbers describ-
ing facts in Table 1. To exemplify, the markings for at-
tributes (1) and (2) were balanced so that the age for the
woman was marked at the same place on the scale as the
life length of the man without operation.
In a consolidation process a younger age of the woman
would speak for prioritizing her and an older age of the
man without the operation would also speak for priority
of the woman. If the woman is prioritized, Diff Con pre-
dicts that the age of the woman should decrease when re-
structured and the expected life length of the man without
surgery should increase in comparison with the factual in-
formation given. In that case, the facts from exactly iden-
tical positions on the two scales are changed in different
directions, and any response bias effects are canceled out.
The corresponding relationship holds for the life length of
the woman without surgery and the age of the man. If the
life length of the woman without surgery is decreased and
the age of the man is increased it supports facts restruc-
turing in favor of prioritizing the woman. Attributes (3)
and (4) have the same kind of balanced pattern of facts
that controls for response bias effects. Attribute (5) with
facts at the midpoint of the scales for both patients needs
no parallel scale because any response bias would have
the same effect on the ratings for both patients. The de-
cision maker’s involvement was measured by an involve-
ment scale.2
2.1.3 Procedure
Participants were given questionnaires in four consecu-
tive sets. The first set consisted of the information about
the patients on VAS’s followed by the decision sheet on
which the participants marked their decision and how
much each attribute favored surgery for each of the two
2The 8 item involvement scale consists of the following items: (1)
This decision is important to me, (2) I am interested in this decision, (3)
This decision is relevant for me, (4) This decision is meaningful to me,
(5) This is a decision that I think about a lot, (6) I do engage myself in
this decision, (7) In general, when I make decisions, it is very important
for me to have made the right decision, (8) In general it is important
to me that I have chosen the correct alternative. The positions of the
positive and negative ends on the response scales were altered between
items in the questionnaire. Chronbach’s α for the involvement scale
was 0.83.
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Table 1: Facts and reproduced facts about patients in Study 1. Data for participants who prioritized the woman for
surgery.
Given facts Reproduced
1st time 2nd time
Man Woman Man Woman Man Woman
(1) Age (years)
33.6 22.4 33.14 ns 21.83 ns 33.75 ns 20.69 *
(4.64) (5.95) (6.21) (5.68)
(2) Expected time to live without surgery (months)
22.4 33.6 26.18 ** 29.45 ** 26.90 *** 28.44 ***
(10.00) (9.45) (7.95) (9.42)
(3) Probability of surviving surgery
14.0 42.0 16.76 ** 40.10 * 16.76 ** 40.48 ns
(7.07) (5.32) (6.52) (5.95)
(4) Probability of surviving 5 years if surviving surgery
42.0 14.0 35.08 *** 19.60 *** 35.26 *** 20.57 ***
(8.65) (8.02) (8.68) (9.62)
(5) Expected quality of life if surviving surgery (0 = complete handicap, 100 = perfect health)
28.0 28.0 29.54 * 28.80 ns 28.83 ns 29.50 ns
(5.22) (5.99) (4.17) (6.04)
Note. Data for 55 participants who prioritized the woman for surgery. Standard deviation are in parentheses. Differ-
ences between facts given and reproductions are significant at * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, and *** p ≤ .001, two-tailed.
patients. The participants rated the importance of the at-
tributes, including gender, by rank ordering them from
1 (most important) to 6 (least important). After this the
involvement scale was administered. The second set of
items attached to the first set served as an intermission
session during which the participants were given a set of
unrelated questions about traffic safety. After having re-
turned set 1 and 2 to the experimenter, the third set was
given to the participants. In this set, they were first asked
to indicate which patient they had chosen in the previ-
ous decision. Then, the man and woman cases were pre-
sented again together with the VAS attributes but without
the markings giving the facts about each of the patients.
The task of the participants was to indicate exactly the
same facts as provided earlier when they made their de-
cisions by replicating the markings on the empty VAS
scales. When the participants had completed this task
they returned the form to the experimenter and received
the fourth set of questionnaires. They again reproduced
the VAS markings and then they filled out the involve-
ment scale once more. The second reproduction was in-
cluded to find out if consolidation changed over a short
period of time. As will be clear in the following this was
not the case. The test sessions took place in a lecture hall
and the participants needed about 45 min to complete the
questionnaires.
2.2 Results
A majority, 55 of the participants decided to prioritize
the woman and 9 participants the man. In the following,
we will first focus our analyses on the more reliable data
from the majority group. Then, the minority group re-
sults will be analyzed in comparisons with the majority
group results. The involvement scale indicated an above-
the-midpoint level of involvement in the problem, with
an average of 45.6 on a scale from 0 (no) to 64 (maxi-
mum) involvement. Hence, the Diff Con requirement of
involvement to trigger differentiation and consolidation
was fulfilled.
Table 1 shows the averages of the reproduced facts for
the group of participants who prioritized the woman. A
comparison of the results of the first and second reproduc-
tions in Table 1 did not show any significant overall dif-
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ference. Thus, in general, post-decision consolidation did
not build up or weaken significantly from the first to the
second reproduction. As will be seen later there was one
exception from this general finding. Because of the gen-
eral trend, session 2 reproductions will be used in the fol-
lowing if nothing else is indicated. We first computed an
index of consolidation (described below). This index was
used to investigate facts distortion in support of surgery of
the woman. The majority of participants who prioritized
the woman (selected alternative) were compared with the
minority of participants who prioritized the man (and had
the woman as a non-selected alternative). Diff Con pre-
dicts that the former group should distort more in favor of
the woman than the latter group.
2.2.1 Consolidation index and consolidation of the
woman alternative
In the first row of Table 1 and the second memory re-
production the woman (chosen alternative) was rated as
younger (20.69) than the objectively given age (22.4) and
the man slightly older than his factual age. This exam-
ple represents facts restructuring in support of the cho-
sen alternative, because the difference advantage for the
woman is increased from 11.20 (33.60−22.40) to 13.06
(33.75−20.69).
The second attribute in the second memory reproduc-
tion shows that the man was judged to live longer and
the woman shorter without surgery compared to the facts.
This also supports a preference difference in support of
surgery of the woman. Note that the advantage to the
woman is a difference and that the difference between the
woman and the man can increase as an indicator of con-
solidation even if the support for the man also increases
significantly. In such a case, support for the woman has
to increase sufficiently more than the support for the man.
Memory reproduction differences from the correct val-
ues on the third attribute in session 2 show that the prob-
ability of surviving surgery becomes greater than the ob-
jective facts for the man and smaller for the woman.
These differences seem to speak against the chosen alter-
native. However, note that these changes may also reflect
response biases towards the middle of the response scale
(Poulton, 1989). This makes it difficult to evaluate the
effect of post-decision consolidation on singular scales.
Fortunately, the present design enables a comparison
of the reconstructions from 14.0 to 16.76 on attribute (3)
and from 14.0 to 20.57 on attribute (4) (second reproduc-
tion Table 1). The comparisons indicate that an increase
in support of the chosen alternative is 3.81 units greater
when the effects of response regression biases are elimi-
nated. This is because the difference is (20.57 - 16.76) =
[(true reproduced value attribute (4) + response regres-
sion + random error) -(true reproduced value attribute
(3) + response regression + random error)] for the two
attributes evaluated jointly with the response regression
effect eliminated.
All changes of values for the woman were scaled so
that positive numbers indicated increased support for pri-
oritizing the woman. The differences supporting the
woman choice concerning the woman alternative are the
following. (1) Objective age of woman – reproduced age,
(2) objective time to live without surgery – reproduced
time, (3) reproduced probability of surviving surgery –
objective probability of surviving surgery, (4) reproduced
probability of surviving 5 years – objective probability of
surviving 5 years and (5) reproduced quality of life – ob-
jective quality of life. The sum of these differences gives
the overall advantage difference in consolidation support-
ing woman priority for surgery. (The numbers in paren-
theses refer to the attributes in Table 1.)
However, downgrading the non-chosen alternative is
also part of decision consolidation. Therefore, the cor-
responding differences for the man alternative support-
ing the prioritization of the woman were also computed,
(1) reproduced age of man —objective age of man etc.
Hence, the man’s disadvantages serve as advantages sup-
porting a woman choice.
Because the VAS scales were balanced, eliminating re-
sponse anchoring biases, we summed the advantage dif-
ferences across attributes for each alternative and for each
participant. The average sum of advantages supporting
the woman alternative (21.22, second memory reproduc-
tion) represents a significant consolidation effect differ-
ent from the hypothesis of a zero difference between the
given facts and the reproduced facts t(54) = 6.43, p ≤
0.001, two tailed test.
The average sum of advantages in support of the
woman in the woman prioritizing group (22.04) was com-
pared with the average sum of advantages in support of
the woman in the man prioritizing group (−5.69) (with
the woman as a non-chosen alternative) and the differ-
ence was significant t(62)=2.99 p ≤ 0.01 (two tailed test,
second reproduction). This shows that the participants
upgraded the chosen alternative more than they upgraded
the non-chosen alternative.
Another research issue was whether the upgrading of
the chosen alternative and the downgrading of the non-
chosen alternative were equally strong in the woman pri-
oritizing group. In a test of the mean sum of advan-
tages upgrading the woman alternative compared with the
mean sum of advantages for the woman by downgrad-
ing the man alternative (second memory reproduction) it
was clear that the consolidation effect depended signifi-
cantly more on upgrading the chosen (+13.42, no upgrad-
ing at all = 0) than downgrading the non-chosen alterna-
tive (−7.79). The difference 13.42 - 7.79 was statistically
significant, t(54) = 2.70, p ≤ 0.01 (two tailed test). The
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Figure 1: Mean sum advantage supporting chosen alter-
native (woman patient) deriving from upgrading the cho-
sen alternative (dotted line) and degrading the non-chosen
alternative (solid line) across sessions in Study 1.
selective consolidation of the woman and man alterna-
tives developed gradually because the corresponding val-
ues at the first memory occasion were +9.22 and −5.94
but the greater upgrading of the woman was not signifi-
cantly different from the downgrading of the man at that
time. Note that the downgrading of the non-chosen alter-
native is an advantage to the chosen alternative, as shown
in Figure 1.
The judged importance of the different attributes on a
scale from 0 (= not at all important) to 100 (= maximally
important) gave the following result. The most important
attribute was Probability of surviving surgery, M = 75.8
(SD of mean = 3.84), followed by Age, M = 58.5 (4.45),
Quality of life M = 55.8 (4.43), Probability of surviving
5 years, M = 51.7 (3.95) and Life length without surgery,
M = 41.6 (4.12). The sex of the patient was not impor-
tant, M = 14.2 (3.72). In summary, the decisive attribute
was Probability of surviving surgery and its importance
was significantly greater than its closest competitor Age,
t(50) = 3.198, p = 0.002 correlated samples.3 Note that
3We compared the attributes Probability of surviving surgery and
Probability of surviving 5 years. They are interesting because the
given facts are numerically exactly the same for both attributes but
switched between the man and woman. In Table 1, for example, com-
paring the judgments of the fact, the woman’s Probability of surviving
surgery (attribute 3 fact = 42) with the man’s Probability of surviving
5 years (attribute 4 fact = 42), one finds that the difference is positive
(40.10−35.08 = 5.02 for the first memory reproduction). This differ-
ence represents the true difference due to consolidation because both
changes favor the woman and the bias effects are eliminated. The dif-
ference is significant t(54) = 4.92, p ≤ 0.001 correlated samples. The
same difference for the second memory reproduction is t(54) = 3.07, p
≤ 0.003. The difference between the judgments of the woman’s Proba-
the conflict attribute speaking against the woman, Proba-
bility of surviving 5 years is changed more in favor of the
woman alternative than the decisive Probability of surviv-
ing surgery attribute. The Life length without surgery at-
tribute is another conflict attribute that was changed more
than the important Age attribute. In conclusion, the re-
sults are in concordance with the hypothesis that consol-
idation occurs primarily on conflict attributes and not on
important decisive attributes supporting the choice that
was made.
In summary, we found significant restructuring of facts
in the post-decision processes. The chosen alternative
was reconstructed more than the non-chosen alternative.
The restructuring process left the most important deci-
sive attribute without systematic distortion depending on
the prior decision while the facts on other important at-
tributes were distorted in post-decision consolidation.
3 Study 2
This study was designed to test the above findings with
participants who were both familiar with VAS scales and
health care issues.
3.1 Method
3.1.1 Participants
A total of 35 students participated in the study. They were
11 advanced nursing students of Mälardalen University
College and 24 advanced students in a program for psy-
chologists at Stockholm University. The nurses were in-
vestigated in conjunction with an exam and the psycholo-
gists were given the questionnaires in some free time be-
tween lectures. This contrasts with Study 1 in which the
data collection was administered by the students’ regular
teacher. There were 23 female and 12 male participants
aged from 23 to 48 years with a median of 29 years.
3.1.2 Material and procedure
The same material as in Study 1 was used except for the
material in the intermission session which consisted of a
revised and somewhat simpler questionnaire about road
traffic to keep the participants busy in the pause before
the third session.
bility of surviving 5 years (19.6) and the man’s Probability of surviving
the surgery (16.76) in the first memory reproduction gives t(54) = 2.60,
p ≤ 0.012 and in the second memory reproduction t(54) = 3.07, p ≤
0.003 (two tailed tests).
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Table 2: Consolidation index for man and woman choices
in Study 2. A positive sign indicates a consolidation dif-
ference in support of a choice and a negative sign the op-
posite.
Choice
Change of
alternative’s facts
supporting choice
Man N=12 Woman N=23
First reproduction of facts
Man alternative 7.71 (3.53)* 4.26 (2.32)
Woman
alternative −3.96 (5.69) 10.39 (2.87)**
Second reproduction of facts
Man alternative 4.00 (3.13) 3.57 (2.10)
Woman
alternative −4.96 (5.64) 12.37 (2.29)***
Note Digits in italics denote support of the chosen al-
ternative. *p ≤ 0.005, ** p≤ 0.01 and ***p ≤ 0.001
in two-tailed t-tests.
4 Results
Twenty-three participants prioritized the woman and 12
the man for surgery. Thus, this study had a greater pro-
portion of man choices (34%) than Study 1 (14%). There
was no correlation between the sex of the participant and
the preference for surgery on the woman or the man. In
addition, there were no differences in the results between
the two groups of participants (nurses and psychologists).
The involvement scale indicated a rather high level of in-
volvement in the problem with an average of 45.4 on the
scale from 0 (no) to 64 (maximum) involvement. Because
of the more equal distribution of choices, we present data
in Table 2 for choices of both the woman and the man.
The average sum of advantages for the woman in the
woman prioritizing group (14.65) was compared with the
sum of advantages for the woman in the group giving the
man priority (−3.75) (with the woman as a non-chosen
alternative) and the difference was significant t(33)=2.65,
p≤ 0.01 (two tailed test, first memory reproduction). This
comparison shows that the chosen alternative was up-
graded more than the non-chosen alternative.
The consolidation index was computed in the same
way as in Study 1 for the woman and man choices sep-
arately. Table 2 gives the sums of mean differences be-
tween ratings for all attributes that supported the choice
in each of the groups giving the man and the woman pri-
ority. Thus, a positive sign signifies a change in support
of the chosen alternative and a negative sign support for
the non-chosen alternative.
For those preferring the man, the chosen alternative in-
dicates significant consolidation of facts restructuring for
the man alternative in the first reproduction. However, the
consolidation of facts support decreases from 7.71 in the
first to 4.00 in the second reproduction. Table 2 shows the
net support for the man choice using both differences for
the man and the woman alternative becomes weaker and
changes from an advantage 3.75 (7.71 — 3.96) in the first
reproduction to a disadvantage in the second reproduction
−0.96 (4.00 − 4.96). The negative sign indicates that the
woman alternative was upgraded. Thus, even when the
man was given priority, the woman alternative gained an
increased support.
For those prioritizing the woman, the consolidation
for the woman choice was strong and increased some-
what over sessions from 14.65 (4.26 + 10.39) to 15.94
(3.57 + 12.37). The positive sign for the man alternative
means that it was downgraded. The woman choices were
very well consolidated. The man choices were consol-
idated only right after the decision and the support dis-
appeared at the second memory reproduction indicating
regret. When facts restructuring occurred, consolidation
was always greater for the chosen alternative (upgrading
its facts support) than for its competitor (downgrading its
facts support).4
In conclusion, the facts consolidation found in Study
1 was replicated for the woman choice. In contrast to
the economics students, more nurses and psychologists
accepted the man’s smaller chance of surviving in the
shorter perspective (14% of surviving surgery) to gain a
greater chance (42%) of a 5 years survival. However, the
consolidation of a man priority was not as successful as
for a woman priority. In fact, a man choice was consol-
idated only right after the decision as shown in Table 2.
Later regret seemed to work against that decision. As in
Study 1, consolidation distortion of facts was found to
be stronger on conflict attributes than on the most impor-
tant decisive attribute. The difference was not statistically
significant due to the small number of participants in each
priority group, but it will be tested in the next study.
4The rank order of importance of the information differed between
participants who prioritized the man and the woman. For those who
choose the woman for surgery, the most important fact was Probability
of surviving the surgery with a mean of rated importance 83.9 on the
scale from 0 to 100. This rating was significantly greater than for the
next in importance fact Probability of surviving 5 years if the surgery
was successful, which was 53.0 , t(11) = 6.30, p ≤ 0.001. For those
who choose the man for surgery, the most important fact was Probabil-
ity of surviving 5 years (79.2) and this was significantly greater than the
rating for the Probability of surviving the surgery (57.1) t(11) = 5.64 p
≤ 0.001. Expected quality of life was rated as the second most impor-
tant attribute (63.3) and it was not significantly different from the most
important attribute. In conclusion, the man was given priority because
of a better prognosis after a successful surgery, while the woman was
given priority based on the better chance of surviving the surgery.
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Table 3: Facts and reproduced facts about patients in Study 3.
Given facts Reproduced
Man Woman Man Woman
(1) Age (years)
34.00 20.00 35.03 ns 20.15 ns
(4.86) (7.57) ns
(2) Expected life length without surgery
20.00 34.00 22.93 ** 28.07 ***
(8.55) (9.43)
(3) Probability of surviving surgery
14.00 42.00 16.03 * 35.67 ***
(7.48) (8.27)
(4) Probability of surviving 5 years if surviving surgery
42.00 14.00 32.20 *** 18.84 ***
(6.69) (8.40)
(5) Expected quality of life if surviving surgery (0 = complete disablement, 100 = perfect health)
25.00 25.00 25.24 ns 26.75 *
(5.74) (5.93)
Note. The table shows given facts and reproduction of facts for the 65 participants who chose to prioritize
the woman for surgery. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. Asterisks denote significant t-tests of
differences between facts given in the first session and reproductions at the second session (*p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01,
and ***p ≤ .001, two-tailed tests).
5 Study 3
This study was designed to test the findings of the ear-
lier studies with a third group of participants and some
changes of the procedure.
5.1 Method
5.1.1 Participants
In all 77 students at the Malmö University College in
Sweden (41 women and 36 men, 19 to 39 years old with
a mean age of 23.0 years) volunteered to participate in
the study. They were recruited from two different depart-
ments (International Migration and Ethnic Relations, and
Technology and Society) at the university.
5.1.2 Material and procedure
The decision material and procedure used in this study
were similar to those in Study 1 and 2, but with three
differences: (1) the response scales were 50 mm long; (2)
the data collection was conducted in two sessions, with
reproduction of the facts at the second session; (3) the
intermission between the two sessions consisted of one
hour of regular class.
5.2 Results
In all, 65 participants prioritized the woman and 12 the
man for surgery, and therefore the following illustra-
tive analyses will focus mainly on the data from woman
choices.
Table 3 gives the mean judgments for the group of par-
ticipants giving priority to the woman. The participants
in that group rank-ordered the attributes in the following
way from the most to the least important for their deci-
sions: (1) Probability of surviving surgery (M = 76.53),
(2) Quality of life if surviving surgery (M = 61.71), (3)
Age (M = 61.39), (4) Probability of surviving 5 years (M
= 54.22), and (5) Life length without surgery (M = 46.03).
The attribute ranked as the most important was signifi-
cantly more important than the second in rank order at-
tribute, t(62) = 4.50, p ≤ 0.001. The most important at-
tribute was the same as in Study 1. The other differences
in importance were insignificant.
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Figure 2: Mean sum advantage supporting chosen alter-
native (woman patient) deriving from upgrading the cho-
sen alternative (dotted line) and the corresponding advan-
tage as a result of degrading the non-chosen alternative
(solid line) in Study 3.
To test the earlier results, the average sum of advan-
tages for the woman in the woman priority group (17.54)
was compared with the sum of advantages for the woman
in the man priority group (2.25) (with the woman as a
non-chosen alternative) and the difference was significant
t(75)=1.86, p≤ 0.05 (one-tailed test, reproduction after
intermission). Thus, the chosen alternative was upgraded
more in support of a decision than the non-chosen alter-
native.
Overall consolidation (see Study 1 for computations)
supported the woman choice by strengthening the woman
+6.04 (no change at all = 0), t(64) = 2.84, p ≤ 0.01; and
downgrading the man +11.49, t(64) = 6.22, p ≤ 0.001
(Figure 2). Restructuring in favor of the woman was sig-
nificantly greater in terms of downgrading of the man al-
ternative than upgrading the woman alternative (11.49 -
6.04), t(64) = 2.21, p ≤ 0.05. Thus, the decision to
prioritize the woman for surgery was consolidated more
by restructuring the man alternative than restructuring the
woman alternative. This contrasts with the result of Study
1, in which the woman alternative was restructured more
than the man alternative.
The most important attribute (3) Probability of surviv-
ing surgery was counterbalanced with attribute (4) Proba-
bility of surviving 5 years if surviving surgery. A compar-
ison of the means of these attributes in the reproduction
indicated a net consolidation for both attributes favoring
a choice of the woman (35.67 - 32.20), t(64) = 3.50, p =
0.001, and (18.84 - 16.03), t(64) = 2.18, p ≤ 0.05.
In summary, the results replicated the findings of study
1 and 2 regarding facts restructuring. Overall, facts re-
structuring was significant and illustrated consolidation
of the chosen alternative. The post-decision consolida-
tion of facts representations occurred on attributes that
were in conflict with the decision or neutral, and not by
strengthening attributes that gave initial support to the
final choice. This finding supported our initial hypoth-
esis. Downgrading of the non-chosen man alternative
contributed more to consolidation than upgrading of the
selected alternative and this contrasts with the result of
Study 1.
6 Discussion
The participants distorted quantitative facts in post-
decision restructuring of a decision problem. The quan-
titative facts distortions followed the same pattern as the
attractiveness distortions found in other studies. This re-
sult verified the Diff Con prediction of facts restructuring
as one of the subprocesses of post-decision consolidation
of a decision. Furthermore, the hypothesis that consolida-
tion would not take place on the most important decisive
attribute was confirmed. Instead, less important and con-
flicting attributes speaking against a choice were recon-
structed in the consolidation process. However, all re-
produced attributes were more or less distorted due to re-
sponse bias effects. The participants had no problems in
using the quantities indicated on the VAS scales as stimuli
and the responses could be analyzed so that any response
biases were eliminated.
If we give these results a more general interpretation
they suggest that, if someone is asked about facts of an
earlier decision problem, she or he will give an answer
about the information that is not systematically biased on
the decisive attribute. Of course, there is a risk of re-
sponse biases but no systematic effects depending on the
earlier decision will appear. However, we can expect sys-
tematic distortions and biases in favor of a chosen alter-
native when facts on less important and conflict attributes
are asked for.
The present design and its controls for response bias
effects made it possible to compare consolidation in terms
of upgrading the chosen alternative and downgrading the
non-chosen alternative. Study 1 and 2 showed greater
upgrading of the woman than downgrading of the man
when the woman was chosen. However, Study 3 showed
the opposite effect. We do not know why this difference
occurred. In future research, it would be interesting to
investigate what determines which alternative is affected
most for different problems, in different contexts and with
different groups of participants. One factor that may play
a role is whether a a decision is interpreted as a choice
between positive desired or between negative undesirable
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options. In may be argued that the distortions were not
post-decisional and occurred before the decision. But,
the decisions were made in front of the facts and there
was no possibility of misperception at this stage.
We were able to investigate the minority of participants
who gave the man priority in Study 2. Their decisions
were consolidated only during a short time after the deci-
sion was made. The man choice with its lower chance of
surviving at the time of surgery and better chances in the
long run in case of survival was not a sustainable choice.
This was evident after the second replication of the facts
and Simon et al. (2007) reported similar results for attrac-
tiveness consolidation in a study with constructed prefer-
ences dissipating after a decision. This raises the interest-
ing question of how long decision consolidation and in-
creased coherence can last. From a learning perspective,
cumulative consolidation of repeated and suboptimal de-
cisions will be counterproductive, meaning that we do not
learn from our mistakes. This is because the next time we
encounter a similar decision problem an earlier alterna-
tive is already consolidated and we will repeat the same
suboptimal decision.
To conclude, we found facts restructuring and distor-
tion after a priority decision. The facts restructuring pro-
cess used systematic distortion of facts on the conflict at-
tribute or less important attributes.
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